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SURVEY OF ILLINOIS LAW: THE INS AND OUTS
OF THE NEW ILLINOIS EVIDENCE RULES
Jeffrey A. Parness*

I. INTRODUCTION
The new Illinois Rules of Evidence (IRE), which took effect January
1, 2011, primarily reaffirm earlier laws dispersed throughout cases, statutes
and rules.1 They modernize many evidence guidelines by incorporating
“uncontroversial developments” found in the Federal Rules of Evidence
(FRE) and in the laws of forty-four other surveyed jurisdictions.2 The new
rules are said to change Illinois evidence laws in only two areas: they add
opinion testimony as a method of proving character and they eliminate
certain requirements within the hearsay exceptions on statements of then
existing mental, emotional or physical condition.3
The new rules reference some, but far from all, preexisting statutes
whose validity “are not affected by” the IRE.4 The rules contemplate future
General Assembly laws on evidence as long as there is no conflict with the
IRE.5 Finally, when there is redundancy between IRE and another Illinois
Supreme Court Rule, “reference should be made solely to the appropriate
Illinois rule of evidence.”6
Other American states have also codified their evidence laws on the
FRE model and, accordingly, both federal and other state experiences
should be helpful to Illinois lawyers and judges.
There are a few pitfalls, however. First, the legislative history behind
the FRE is dispersed so that its persuasive use in Illinois courts will be
challenging. Second, the role of the General Assembly in promulgating
new evidence laws is uncertain. Uncertainty arises, in part, because

*

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Jeffrey A. Parness is a Professor Emeritus at Northern Illinois University College of Law and a
Visiting Professor of Law at The John Marshall Law School in Chicago. He thanks Peter Carlson
and Russell Kazda for their excellent research assistance while reserving for himself all blame for
errors.
ILL. R. EVID. committee commentary.
Id.
Id.
Id. (“It is important to note that the Illinois Rules of Evidence are not intended to abrogate or
supercede any current statutory rules of evidence.”)
ILL. R. EVID. 101 (“A statutory rule of evidence is effective unless in conflict with a rule or a
decision of the Illinois Supreme Court.”).
ILL. R. EVID. committee commentary.
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evidence guidelines often implicate substantive law policies, thus
prompting General Assembly responsibilities. Perhaps at least some
evidence lawmaking in Illinois should be undertaken jointly by legislators
and judges. Third, not all IRE provisions are modeled on FRE provisions
so that care is required when utilizing federal precedents. IRE diversions
from the FRE are sometimes expressly referenced in the notes
accompanying the IRE. At other times, open issues of Illinois evidence law
are recognized; here there may be diversions from the FRE. Fourth, even
when the IRE and FRE appear similar, at times they will (and should) be
read differently. Fifth, there may be more choice of law issues when
applying the IRE rather than the FRE. Finally, there are some major
questions left unaddressed in the IRE and little guidance from the rule
makers and others on who will answer, when answers will come and what
the answers will likely be.
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
The relevant legislative history underlying the FRE varies depending
upon the ultimate lawmaker. The initial FRE took effect only upon
Congressional enactment. The U.S. Supreme Court’s first proposed
evidence rules, with their extensive Advisory Committee Notes, were not
fully enacted by Congress. Much evidence codification, as with FRE 501
and the rejection by Congress of the U.S. Supreme Court’s explicit
proposals on privileges, arose initially from extensive Senate and House
debates rich with Congressional reports that continue to be used today by
those deciphering the FRE.7 Since the FRE enactment, further codified
evidence rules, like the rules on similar crimes and conduct in sexual
assault and child molestation cases,8 were developed primarily in Congress.
Yet, many of the initial FRE proposals (as on “relevant evidence”),9 as well
as some later FRE rulemaking initiatives (as on subsequent remedial
measures),10 were chiefly drafted by the U.S. Supreme Court’s Advisory

7.

8.
9.
10.

A history of the enactment of the original FRE is found in 21 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT &
KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 5006 (2d ed. 2005) [hereinafter
WRIGHT & GRAHAM] and James Wm. Moore & Helen L. Bendix, Congress, Evidence and
Rulemaking, 84 YALE L.J. 9 (1974) [hereinafter Moore & Bendix]. A history of more recent FRE
lawmaking is found in WRIGHT & GRAHAM, at § 5007.
FED. R. EVID. 413–415 (effective September 13, 1994 via Violent Crime Control & Law
Enforcement Act, Pub. L. 103-322, § 320935, 108 Stat. 2137).
FED. R. EVID. 401 (“‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or
less probable than it would be without the evidence.”)
FED. R. EVID. 407 (“When, after an injury or harm allegedly caused by an event, measures are
taken that, if taken previously, would have made the injury or harm less likely to occur, evidence
of the subsequent measures is not admissible to prove negligence, culpable conduct, a defect in a
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Committee. The Advisory Committee Notes, instead of the Congressional
reports, guide these rules.
III. THE ROLE OF LEGISLATION
The Illinois Supreme Court recognized as appropriate both past and
future evidence lawmaking by the Illinois General Assembly. Yet the roles
of legislators clearly differ in Washington, D.C., Springfield, Illinois, and
other American states. In Washington, Congress chiefly has the last word.
New or amended evidence rules proposed by the U.S. Supreme Court are
transmitted to Congress for review.11 “Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge
or modify any substantive right.”12 Transmissions “take effect . . . unless
otherwise provided by law.”13 As to evidentiary privileges, transmissions
“shall have no force or effect unless approved by Act of Congress.”14
In Springfield, there are no comparable transmissions of rule
proposals and no express constraints involving substantive rights. While
the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure limits Illinois Supreme Court
rulemaking to matters “supplementary to, but not inconsistent with” the
Code,15 the Illinois Supreme Court Rules seemingly make a rule
supplementary only to a non-Code statute regulating “the procedure in
particular kind of action,”16 as with probate,17 parentage,18 and marriage

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

17.

18.

product, a defect in a product's design, or a need for a warning or instruction. This rule does not
require the exclusion of evidence of subsequent measures when offered for another purpose, such
as proving ownership, control, or feasibility of precautionary measures, if controverted, or
impeachment.”). As noted later, infra note 34, some Illinois General Assembly input into any
new subsequent remedial measures rule in Illinois (there is now no IRE 407) seems appropriate
given prior General Assembly interests, as found in 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-2105 (product
liability claims).
28 U.S.C. § 2074(a) (2006).
28 U.S.C. § 2072(b).
28 U.S.C. § 2074 (a).
28 U.S.C. § 2074(b). On ultimate Congressional authority, see, e.g., Benjamin H. Barton, An
Article I Theory of the Inherent Powers of the Federal Courts (March 15, 2011),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1787400.
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-104(a) (2010).
ILL. SUP. CT. R. 1. In the federal district courts, comparably, there are or have been special
statutory evidence laws beyond the FRE and the preceding general common law principles.
Special laws, at times, guide admiralty, bankruptcy and copyright proceedings. WRIGHT &
GRAHAM, supra note 7, § 5004.
“The Civil Practice Law and all existing and future amendments and modifications thereof and the
Supreme Court Rules now or hereafter adopted in relation to that Law shall apply to all
proceedings under this Act, except as otherwise provided in this Act.” 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16 (2010).
See, e.g., People ex. rel. Sheppard v. Money, 124 Ill.2d 265, 284-85, 529 N.E.2d 542, 551 (1988)
(“Establishment of paternity, determination of child support obligations, and enforcement of those
obligations are indeed regulated by a statute other than the Civil Practice Law or our rules”; the
“procedural requirements” of the Parentage Act “are not an unconstitutional legislative
encroachment upon the judiciary,” as long as “they do not conflict with a rule of this court.”).
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dissolution.19 As for judicial review of Illinois administrative agency
actions, the General Assembly usually dictates procedures.20
In other American states, the roles of legislators differ from the
approaches taken by Washington, D.C. and Springfield. For example, in
Kentucky, the evidence rules were a “joint effort” by the legislature and
high court when first adopted in the early 1990s.21 The rules were passed
by the legislature and then adopted by the court “to the extent that they may
have constituted a rule of practice or procedure.”22 Under the Kentucky
constitution, the high court has had for some time exclusive authority to
enact “rules of practice and procedure for the Court of Justice.”23 Since
initial enactment of the evidence rules, further changes in Kentucky
evidence laws have been guided by a rule requiring the high court to report
possible rule amendments to the legislature, which may disapprove;24 a rule
recognizing the legislature “may amend any proposal reported by the
Supreme Court”;25 and, a rule noting that the legislature “may adopt
amendments or additions to the Kentucky Rules of Evidence not
reported.”26 Legislative changes, however, are limited by the exclusive
judicial authority over rules of practice and procedure.27
In contrast to Kentucky, practice and procedure rules are explicitly
distinguished constitutionally from evidence rules in Missouri. The
Missouri Supreme Court may establish rules of practice, procedure and
pleading for all courts.28 But, these rules “shall not change substantive

19.

20.

21.

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/802 (2010) (“The Supreme Court . . . and the respective circuit courts,
may adopt such rules as they deem necessary and expedient” to carry out the provisions of the
Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act). See also Strukoff v. Strukoff, 76 Ill.2d 53,
389 N.E.2d 1170 (1979); People ex rel. Daley v. Fitzgerald, 123 Ill.2d 175, 526 N.E.2d 131
(1988).
ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 6 (appellate court review); ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 9 (circuit court review).
Compare Chambers v. Indus. Comm., 132 Ill. App. 3d 891, 893, 478 N.E.2d 498, 499 (1st Dist.
1985) (Civil Procedure Code and Illinois Supreme Court Rules inapplicable to judicial reviews of
Workmen’s Compensation Act proceedings) with People v. ICC, 407 Ill. App. 3d 207, 220, 941
N.E.2d 947, 958-59 (1st Dist. 2010) (some role for supreme court in regulating direct appellate
court review of administrative decisions).
Mullins v. Commonwealth, 956 S.W.2d 210, 211 (Ky. 1997). This joint effort was “a polite
fiction” recognizing “some parts of the rules fell within the sole purview of the legislature
(substantive law), whereas others fell within the sole purview” of the high court (practice and
procedure). Commonwealth v. Chauvin, 316 S.W.3d 279, 285 (Ky. 2010). The fiction avoided a
fight “over which was which.” Chauvin, 316 S.W.3d at 285.
Chauvin, 316 S.W.3d at 285.
KY. CONST. pt. 1, § 116.
KY. R. EVID. 1102(a).
KY. R. EVID. 1102(b).
Id.
Chauvin, 316 S.W.3d at 284.
MO. CONST. art. V, § 5.
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rights, or the law relating to evidence.”29 And, in contrast to Kentucky,
high court “rules governing practice and procedure in civil and criminal
cases in all courts” in Alaska may be changed by legislators in the General
Assembly by two-thirds vote of the members elected to each house.30
In Illinois, the ultimate responsibility for new evidence laws
applicable in the Illinois circuit courts lies with the Illinois Supreme
Court.31 For most new evidence rules (and certainly for common law
developments), General Assembly input should be limited, at best, with an
even more limited role for legislators in evidence issues involving attorney
regulation32 and jury trial procedures.33 Yet when evidence laws will, or
may, significantly impact substantive rights, or civil or criminal procedure
laws now and traditionally addressed by the General Assembly,34 perhaps
29.
30.
31.

32

33.

34.

Id. (no changes as well to laws relating to the oral exam of witnesses, juries, jury trials or
appeals). Evidence laws in Missouri primarily are located in the Revised Statutes, Chapter 490.
ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 15 (also includes “rules governing the administration of all courts”). In
Alaska, evidence laws primarily appear in Alaska Statutes § 09.25.
The Advisor to the Illinois Supreme Court Special Committee on Illinois Evidence (Committee)
says little about this authority in his latest treatise, which follows his earlier treatise that was
significantly used by the Committee. MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, GRAHAM’S HANDBOOK OF ILLINOIS
EVIDENCE, at xiii, § 101 (Wolters Kluwer, 10th ed. 2010) [hereinafter GRAHAM’S HANDBOOK].
See, e.g., ILL. R. EVID. 101 (“A statutory rule of evidence is effective unless in conflict with a rule
or decision of the Illinois Supreme Court.”). See also Jeffrey A. Parness & Bruce Elliot Keller,
Increased and Accessible Judicial Rulemaking, 8 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 817 (1988) (discussing the
history of increased, and at times exclusive, Illinois Supreme Court authority for procedural laws
governing Illinois circuit court actions).
See, e.g., People ex rel. Brazen v. Finley, 119 Ill.2d 485, 492, 519 N.E.2d 898, 901 (1988) (“This
court’s sole authority to regulate and discipline attorney conduct arises from our inherent power to
govern admission to the practice of law in Illinois.”). But see Eli Wald, Should Judges Regulate
Lawyers?, 42 MCGEORGE L. REV. 149, 174–75 (2010) (“[T]he simplistic assumption that judges
should regulate lawyers” must be abandoned, with “a contextual comparative institutional analysis
scrutinizing the promulgation and enforcement abilities of the judiciary broken into various
elements . . . and to contrast them with those of alternative regulatory bodies.”).
See, e.g., Lebron v. Gottlieb Mem’l Hosp., 237 Ill.2d 217, 238, 930 N.E.2d 895, 908 (2010)
(statutory caps on noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases invalidated as they
constituted a “legislative remittitur” that “unduly” encroached upon “the fundamental judicial
prerogative of determining whether a jury’s assessment of damages is excessive within the
meaning of law”); People v. Jackson, 69 Ill.2d 252, 260, 371 N.E.2d 602, 606 (1977) (invalidating
Code of Criminal Procedure provision granting to attorneys the right to examine potential jurors
personally).
Substantive rights possibly impacted by evidence laws include trade secret protections.
Procedural laws now and traditionally addressed by the General Assembly include subsequent
remedial measure evidence in product liability cases, 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-2105, which may
be preempted if a new IRE 407 is adopted. Such an adoption would likely speak to subsequent
remedial measures; such a new rule was contemplated by the Special Evidence Committee. GINO
L. DIVITO, THE ILLINOIS RULES OF EVIDENCE; A COLOR-CODED GUIDE CONTAINING THE NEW
RULES, THE COMMITTEE’S GENERAL AND SPECIFIC COMMENTS, A COMPARISON WITH THE
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE, AND ADDITIONAL COMMENTARY 30–31 (2010), available at
http://www.tdrlawfirm.com/downloads/Illinois_Rules_of_Evidence_Color-Coded_Guide.pdf.
[hereinafter DIVITO]. Procedural laws now and traditionally addressed by the General Assembly
also include evidentiary presentations in Illinois circuit courts when final administrative agency
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joint lawmaking by Illinois legislators and judges (as in Kentucky or as
with General Assembly representation on judicial rulemaking bodies) is
advisable, because later thorny separation of powers issues will be
avoided,35 though Supreme Court expertise should merit significant
deference.36
IV. IRE DIVERSIONS FROM THE FRE
As the IRE chiefly codify existing evidence laws, many of which
differ from the FRE, there are explicit references in the IRE to the
continuing diversions. For example, as to expert testimony, IRE 702
confirms Illinois as a Frye state while FRE 702 operates under the Daubert
standard.37 And, as to former testimony and hearsay exceptions, IRE
804(b)(1) speaks to “an evidence deposition” while FRE 804(b)(1) covers
“a deposition” because the Federal Civil Procedure Rules (FRCP) do not
distinguish between discovery and evidence depositions.
There are also notable absences from the IRE of provisions in the
FRE. Diversions here are not inevitable. Illinois evidence law simply
remains uncertain. For example, there is no IRE 502. FRE 502, added in
2008 and coordinated with FRCP 26,38 addresses waivers of some

35.

36.

37.
38.

decisions are reviewed. See, e.g., 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-110 (2010) (no new or additional
evidence is allowed during judicial review); ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 9 (“Circuit courts shall have
such power to review administrative action as provided by law.”).
Recently, similar advise was given to the Connecticut high court. Thomas A. Bishop, Evidence
Rulemaking: Balancing the Separation of Powers, 43 CONN. L. REV. 265, 267 (2010). On
Congressional actions in adopting the FRE, Professors Wright and Graham say, “we can say that
by intervening in the making of the Evidence Rules Congress gave them a broader claim to
legitimacy than they might have otherwise had” (meaning there could be no Rules Enabling Act
challenges). WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 7, at § 5006.
See, e.g., Moore & Bendix, supra note 7, at 38 (“There has thus been a policy of Congressional
deferral to Court rulemaking. This policy is wise . . . As demonstrated by the Rules of Evidence,
the House effort at statutory rulemaking, though undertaken in a serious, objective and scholarly
spirit, has shown the value of the previous congressional policy of according Court-promulgated
rules a substantial presumption of wisdom. In the future, rulemaking should be left in the hands
of the judiciary.”). Too much exclusive judicial rulemaking could prompt backlash, as with
reforms like the 2011 proposed Arizona constitutional amendment. S.J. Res. 1041, 49th Leg., 1st
Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2009) (provides rules adopted by supreme court may be amended or repealed by
the legislature or by the public via initiative and declares the authority to enact substantive,
procedural, and evidentiary laws is not a power inherent in the judiciary but is a legislative power
inherent in the legislature and the people). One example of legislative/judicial tensions in
evidence lawmaking is found in Leads v. Fields, 245 P.3d 911 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2011).
The Comment to IRE 702 “confirms that Illinois is a Frye state . . . as set forth in Donaldson v.
Central Illinois Public Service Co., 199 Ill.2d 63 (2002).” ILL. R. EVID. 702 committee’s cmt.
Federal Rule of Evidence 26(b)(5)(B) provides:
Information Produced. If information produced in discovery is subject to a claim
of privilege or of protection as trial preparation material, the party making the
claim may notify any party that received the information of the claim and the
basis for it. After being notified, a party must promptly return, sequester, or
destroy the specified information and any copies it has; must not use or disclose
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disclosed, and some related and undisclosed, information arguably subject
to attorney-client privilege or work-product protection. In the federal
courts under FRE 502, certain inadvertent disclosures of some information
operate as waivers of the disclosed information and related but undisclosed
information. Other inadvertent disclosures only waive the protections for
the disclosed information.39 Outside of the materials guided by FRE 502,
the federal courts are split on waiver standards.40
With no explicit rule in Illinois, case law governs waivers. Precedents
have been described as unclear. One federal district judge found the Illinois
appellate courts split on whether an inadvertent disclosure of attorney-client
communication can constitute a waiver, with no Illinois Supreme Court
authority.41 Work product protections are narrower in Illinois courts than in
federal courts, with a privilege for only opinion work product.42 Illinois
precedents on waiving opinion work product protections are also unclear.43
Waivers outside of attorney-client privilege and work-product
protections will be difficult in Illinois as they are guided by a greater mix of
rules and statutes than operate in the federal courts. In the federal courts,
the FRE direct that in the absence of statute, nonconstitutional privilege
laws are “governed by the principles of common law” developed “in the
light of reason and experience.”44 Congress has not said much about
longstanding, or new, privileges.45 By contrast, the Illinois General

39.
40.

41.
42.
43.

44.
45.

the information until the claim is resolved; must take reasonable steps to retrieve
the information if the party disclosed it before being notified; and may promptly
present the information to the court under seal for a determination of the claim.
The producing party must preserve the information until the claim is resolved.
FED. R. EVID. 26(b)(5)(B).
Id.
WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 7, at Evidence Rule 502 (outside FRE 502 (i.e., disclosures
outside a federal proceeding or federal office), the lower federal courts have reached differing
conclusions on the standards for waiver, with few courts finding intent to disclose is necessary,
with a majority finding careless disclosure is necessary, and with some courts recognizing waivers
for any inadvertent disclosures). See also Gray v. Bicknell, 86 F.3d 1472, 1482–84 (8th Cir.
1996) (describing similar differences amongst state courts).
Howell v. Joffee, 483 F. Supp. 2d 659 (N.D. Ill. 2007). See also Dalen v. Ozite Corp., 230 Ill.
App. 3d 18, 26–30, 594 N.E.2d 1365, 1370–72 (2d Dist. 1992) (both parties invoked federal case
law “since Illinois courts have been silent”).
ILL. SUP. CT. R. 201(b)(2).
See, e.g., Dalen, 230 Ill. App. 3d at 26–30, 594 N.E.2d at 1370–72 (finding Illinois courts “silent”
while opining that any law on “waiver of attorney-client privilege . . . applies to waiver of the
work product doctrine.”). See also W. States Ins. Co. v. O’Hara, 357 Ill. App. 3d 509, 518, 828
N.E.2d 842, 849 (4th Dist. 2005) (citing Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Int’l Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 144
Ill.2d 178, 196, 579 N.E.2d 322, 330 (1991)) (opinion work product is discoverable, without
waiver, “upon a showing of impossibility of securing similar information from other sources.”).
FED. R. EVID. 501.
But see 26 U.S.C. § 7525(a) which says, in part:
(1) General rule.—With respect to tax advice, the same common law
protections of confidentiality which apply to a communication between a taxpayer
and an attorney shall also apply to a communication between a taxpayer and any
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Assembly, in the Civil Procedure Code,46 often has spoken on privileges,
including husband and wife (both testimonial47 and communications)48;
physician and patient;49 informant’s;50 clergy;51 reporter’s;52 and voter’s.53
federally authorized tax practitioner to the extent the communication would be
considered a privileged communication if it were between a taxpayer and an
attorney.

46.
47.

48.
49.

50.

(2) Limitations.—Paragraph (1) may only be asserted in—
(A) any noncriminal tax matter before the Internal Revenue Service; and
(B) any noncriminal tax proceeding in Federal court brought by or against the
United States.
26 U.S.C. § 7525(a) (2006) (emphasis in original). See also 11 U.S.C. § 542(e) (2006)
(“applicable privilege” in matters involving turnover of property to estates during bankruptcy). At
times there are federal agency regulations. See, e.g., 20 C.F.R. 402.95 (2010) (deliberative
process, attorney work product and attorney-client communication privileges); 45 C.F.R. 5.66
(2010) (similar).
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/101 (2010).
An Illinois statute provides:
Husband and wife. In all actions, husband and wife may testify for or against
each other, provided that neither may testify as to any communication or
admission made by either of them to the other or as to any conversation between
them during marriage, except in actions between such husband and wife, and in
actions where the custody, support, health or welfare of their children or children
in either spouse's care, custody or control is directly in issue, and as to matters in
which either has acted as agent for the other.
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-801 (2010).
Id.
An Illinois statute provides:
Physician and patient. No physician or surgeon shall be permitted to disclose any
information he or she may have acquired in attending any patient in a professional
character, necessary to enable him or her professionally to serve the patient,
except only (1) in trials for homicide when the disclosure relates directly to the
fact or immediate circumstances of the homicide, (2) in actions, civil or criminal,
against the physician for malpractice, (3) with the expressed consent of the patient
. . . (4) in all actions brought by or against the patient, his or her personal
representative, a beneficiary under a policy of insurance, or the executor or
administrator of his or her estate wherein the patient's physical or mental
condition is an issue, (5) upon an issue as to the validity of a document as a will
of the patient . . . (7) in actions, civil or criminal, arising from the filing of a
report in compliance with the Abused and Neglected Child Reporting Act . . . (9)
in prosecutions where written results of blood alcohol tests are admissible
pursuant to . . . the Illinois Vehicle Code . . . In the event of a conflict between the
application of this Section and the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities
Confidentiality Act to a specific situation, the provisions of the Mental Health and
Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act shall control.
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-802 (2010).
An Illinois statute provides:
Informant's privilege. (a) Except as provided in subsection (b), if an individual (i)
submits information concerning a criminal act to a law enforcement agency or to
a community organization that acts as an intermediary in reporting to law
enforcement and (ii) requests anonymity, then the identity of that individual is
privileged and confidential and is not subject to discovery or admissible in
evidence in a proceeding.
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-802.3 (2010).
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It has also spoken elsewhere, as in the Mental Health and Developmental
Disabilities Confidentiality Act54 and the Hospital Licensing Act.55
When addressing waivers, the Illinois General Assembly has at times
not spoken (as with clergy).56 At other times it has spoken on waivers in
differing ways, as with “written consent” as to rape crisis personnel,57
“written or oral consent” as to union agent and member,58 and “express
consent” as to interpreters.59 In the absence of statutes on waivers, one
distinguished observer suggests similar common law principles will govern
all waivers, that is, uniformity regardless of the underlying privilege or
protection.60
When addressing waivers, the Illinois General Assembly has given no
indication that privileges may be waived by those who do not hold the
privilege, even those in privity with or agents of the privilege holders.
51.

52.
53.

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

59.
60.

An Illinois statute provides:
Clergy. A clergyman or practitioner of any religious denomination accredited by
the religious body to which he or she belongs, shall not be compelled to disclose
in any court, or to any administrative board or agency, or to any public officer, a
confession or admission made to him or her in his or her professional character or
as a spiritual advisor in the course of the discipline enjoined by the rules or
practices of such religious body or of the religion which he or she professes, nor
be compelled to divulge any information which has been obtained by him or her
in such professional character or as such spiritual advisor.
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-803 (2010).
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-901 (2010) (“Reporter’s Privilege. Source of information. No court
may compel any person to disclose the source of any information obtained by a reporter except as
provided in Part 9.”).
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-910 (2010) (“No person shall be compelled to disclose, in any
proceeding conducted by a court, commission, administrative agency or other tribunal in the State,
the name of any candidate for whose nomination, election or retention in office the person voted,
or whether the person voted for or against any question of public policy, as defined in Section 1-3
of The Election Code, at any election held within this State.”).
740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110/1 (2010).
210 ILL. COMP. STAT. 85/1 (2010).
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-803.
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-802.1(d) (2010) (“[N]o rape crisis counselor shall disclose any
confidential communication . . . without the written consent of the victim . . . .”).
An Illinois statute provides:
Union agent and union member . . . (b) A union agent may use or reveal
information obtained during the course of fulfilling his or her professional
representative duties: . . . (4) when, after full disclosure has been provided, the
written or oral consent of the bargaining unit member has been obtained or, if the
bargaining unit member is deceased or has been adjudged incompetent by a court
of competent jurisdiction, the written oral consent of the bargaining unit
member’s estate.
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-803.5(b)(4) (2010).
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-911 (2010) (“Language interpreter's privilege . . . (c) The language
interpreter shall not disclose the communication without the express consent of the person who
has the right to claim the underlying privilege.”).
GRAHAM’S HANDBOOK, supra note 31, at § 506.1 (on waivers of privilege by voluntary
disclosure, Professor Graham combines cases involving varying privileges and suggests no
distinctions).
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Thus, in the rape crisis context, the “written consent of the victim” is
needed under statute before a “rape crisis counselor shall disclose any
confidential communication.”61 But with opinion work product and
attorney-client communication materials outside of Illinois, lawyers are, at
times, deemed capable of waiving the protections and privileges held by
their clients.62
V. CASE LAW DIVERSIONS FOR COMPARABLE PROVISIONS
Even where the IRE and FRE have identical or similar provisions,
federal and Illinois cases can still vary. Certainly, as with common law
privileges, preexisting case diversions should continue. Therefore, as to
privileged communications between attorneys and corporate clients, in
Illinois there is the control group test even with the new IRE 501. 63 In the
federal courts, the comparable test under FRE 501 is more protective of
confidential communications.64
Further, even when there are no preexisting case diversions and the
IRE follows the FRE, future case diversions are possible. While FRE cases
may be “instructive,” they need not be “persuasive.”65 The FRE cases have
not been persuasive, for example, in some American states where a
heightened standard of proof is needed for preliminary findings that prior
misconduct has occurred, where such misconduct will be used to prove
matters other than propensity (like proof of common plan or design).66

61.
62.

63.
64.
65.
66.

735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-802.1(d). See also 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-803.5(b)(4) (“bargaining
unit member” consents); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-911 (“person who has the right to claim the
underlying privilege” consents).
See, e.g., Mendenhall v. Barber-Greene Co., 531 F. Supp. 951, 955 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (assuming
lawyer’s acts could waive client’s privilege); Georgetown Manor, Inc. v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 753 F.
Supp. 936, 938–39 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (similar). But see Cities Serv. Helex, Inc. v. United States,
618 F.2d 121 (Ct. Cl. 1977) (no case where attorney held able to waive client privilege). As
originally proposed by the U.S. Supreme Court, Federal Rule of Evidence 511 would have said:
“A person upon whom these rules confer a privilege against disclosure of the confidential matter
or communication waives the privilege if he or his predecessor while holder of the privilege
voluntarily discloses or consents to disclosure of any significant part of the matter or
communication.” The accompanying Advisory Committee’s Note indicates the same waiver rule
applies to all privileges and is silent on whether and how a privilege holder can act through an
agent. FED. R. EVID. 511 advisory committee’s note. See also United States v. Gulf Oil Corp.,
760 F.2d 292, 295 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1985) (differing waiver standards for attorney-client
privilege and work product protection).
Consolidation Coal Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 89 Ill.2d 103, 432 N.E.2d 250 (1982) (control
group).
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981) (rejecting control group).
State v. Terrazas, 944 P.2d 1194 (Ariz. 1997) (differing standard of proof for prior bad acts
though the Arizona and federal evidence rules are similar).
State v. Aaron L., 865 A.2d 1135, 1152–53 (Conn. 2005) (rejecting heightened standard while
recognizing other states have differed).
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VI. CHOICE OF LAW ISSUES
There will likely be far more choice of law issues when applying the
IRE than the FRE. Law choices are often necessary when Illinois courts
hear non-Illinois substantive law claims. Where competing laws conflict,
Illinois courts must decide whether a matter implicating admissibility is
substantive or procedural. If substantive, non-Illinois law usually applies; if
procedural, Illinois law typically applies.
Matters implicating admissibility that are often substantive will
include, if the FRE model is followed, privilege and privilege waivers,67
witness competency68 and the effects of presumptions.69 On these matters
the FRE expressly choose nonfederal laws when nonfederal claims are
heard in the federal courts. As to privilege, competency and presumptions,
the IRE are silent on choice of law when non-Illinois claims are heard in
Illinois state courts.70

67.

68.

69.

70.

FRE 501 says that “in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or
defense as to which state law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness, person
government, state or political subdivision thereof shall be determined in accordance with state
law.” FED. R. EVID. 501. Yet FRE 502 also says that “even if state law provides that rule of
decision,” disclosure of “communication or information covered by the attorney-client privilege
or work product protection” made “in a federal proceeding or to a federal office or agency” is
governed by the Rule 502 waiver standards (distinguishing between inadvertent disclosures and
intentional waivers). FED. R. EVID. 502(a), (b) & (f). The Uniform Rules of Evidence, as
amended in 2005, say nothing in their privilege provisions, Rules 501–511, about choice of law.
See FED. R. EVID. 501–511. The history of the Uniform Rules of Evidence, and their influence on
the FRE lawmakers, is found in WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 7, at § 5005.
FRE 601 says that generally every person is competent to be a witness, but goes on: “However, in
civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or defense as to which State
law supplies the rule of decision, the competency of a witness shall be determined in accordance
with State law.” FED. R. EVID. 601. By contrast, the Uniform Rules of Evidence, as amended in
2005, say nothing (in Rule 601) about choice of law. Id.
FRE 302 provides: “In civil actions and proceedings, the effect of a presumption respecting a fact
which is an element of a claim or defense as to which State Law supplies the rule of decision is
determined in accordance with State law.” By contrast the Uniform Rules of Evidence, as
amended in 2005, Rule 302(c) only says: “The effect of presumption respecting a fact that is an
element of a claim or defense as to which federal law provides the rule of decision is determined
in accordance with federal law.” The Illinois Evidence Committee Advisor, in his treatise, does
say:
Illinois courts give effect to the federal law of presumptions under the same
circumstances and to the same extent to which federal courts are required to give
effect to state law of presumptions. Thus a presumption representing a fact
relating to a cause of action or defense as to which federal law supplies the rule of
decision is to be given effect in accordance with federal law.
GRAHAM’S HANDBOOK, supra note 31, at § 301.11. He gives no citations and does not mention a
cause of action or defense as to which some other state law, or foreign law, supplies the rule of
decision. Id.
IRE 601 on witness competency contains no provision on non-Illinois claims heard in Illinois
courts. One member of the special Illinois Supreme Court Committee on Illinois Evidence opined
this was because such a provision rule was “unnecessary in Illinois state proceedings.” DIVITO,
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Generally, in choice of evidence law settings, Illinois state courts
employ the standards recognized by the American Law Institute (ALI) on
conflict of laws.71 At times, the ALI standards dictate whether local
evidence law is always employed. For example, one standard demands the
“local law of the forum determines how the content of foreign law is to be
shown and the effect of a failure to show such content.”72 At other times,
the ALI standards envision varying balancing tests involving forum law and
the law of another state. Such tests all involve which state has “the most
significant relationship” with the evidentiary issue.73
As noted, privilege laws are often substantive so that such Illinois
laws may not apply when a non-Illinois claim is heard in an Illinois circuit
court. Thus, there can be choice of law issues regarding the scope of the
attorney-client privilege. For example, in Illinois the privilege covers
communications by both attorneys and clients.74 Elsewhere, the attorneyclient privilege extends only to communications from the client to the
attorney, and thus not to communications from the attorney to the client.75
VII. CONCLUSION
The IRE are modeled on the FRE. But the evidence lawmakers
differ in Washington, D.C. and in Springfield, Illinois. Further, because
most preexisting differences between Illinois and federal evidence laws
continue, FRE precedents will not always guide IRE applications. Where

71.

72.
73.

74.

75.

supra note 34, at 55. The same member says IRE 302 is blank regarding presumptions “because
the Erie doctrine does not apply in Illinois state courts,” the FRE 302 principle “is not required.”
Id. at 30. The member goes on to say choice of law issues will be decided by the Restatement
Second of Conflict of Law. Id. Seemingly, IRE 502 on privilege waiver was not adopted in
Illinois in some form because the case law was “relatively undeveloped.” Id. at 52.
See, e.g., Allianz Ins. Co. v. Guidant Corp., 373 Ill. App. 3d 652, 667, 869 N.E.2d 1042, 1056 (2d
Dist. 2007) (“When faced with a claim of privilege in which there are factual connections to more
than one state . . . (citation omitted) Illinois follows the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws
. . . .”). The ALI standards frequently shun procedure/substance classifications that are often used
in other choice of law settings. Id. at 668, 869 N.E.2d at 1056–57. See also Thomas O. Main,
The Procedural Foundation of Substantive Law, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 801, 841 (2010) (doctrines
founded on false substance/procedure dichotomy “are flawed and vulnerable”).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS§ 136(2) (1996).
Compare, e.g., id. at § 139(1) (if “contrary to the strong public policy of the forum,” local law
rather than law of state with most significant relationship governs privilege) and id. at § 139(2)
(privilege law of state with most significant relationship governs unless there exists “special
reason” why forum policy should be used).
See, e.g., Dickerson v. Dickerson, 322 Ill. 492, 500, 153 N.E. 740, 743 (1926) (“It is essential to
the ends of justice that clients should be safe in confiding to their counsel the most secret facts and
to receive advice in the light thereof, without peril of publicity.”). See also Newton v. Meissner,
76 Ill. App. 3d 479, 394 N.E.2d 1241 (1st Dist. 1979).
Harrisburg Auth. v. CIT Capital USA, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 2d 380 (M.D. Pa. 2010) (as New York
law was like Illinois law and unlike Pennsylvania law, and as both New York and Pennsylvania
governmental interests were at play in a state law claim, federal court had to choose which state
privilege law to apply).
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the FRE precedents are more likely persuasive, federal public policies can
emanate chiefly from an array of sources including the FRE’s advisory
committee notes, Congressional debates and reports, and federal case
precedents. Other state court policies may also persuade, however, even
where the FRE model is followed, as when better policies have been
implemented elsewhere. Finally, there will be more litigation on choice of
evidence laws in Illinois state courts since the IRE, unlike the FRE, do not
dictate many of the choices to be made when Illinois courts hear nonIllinois claims.
As before the IRE, Illinois evidence statutes—in and outside of the
Civil and Criminal Procedure Codes—will often guide Illinois judges and
lawyers. So too will many new and old case precedents. Yet now the IRE
will also guide, operating only at times like their FRE counterparts. On
occasion, as with certain privilege waivers, uncertainty over Illinois
evidence laws will continue, albeit with the new set of written rules.

